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WORKERS’ COMPENSATION/CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW—OPT-OUT AND THE FOURTH ERA OF WORKERS’
COMPENSATION: HAS INDUSTRY LEFT THE BARGAINING
TABLE?
Daniel E. Walker
Over the past decade, state legislatures have been actively exploring
politically feasible ways to lower workers’ compensation insurance costs
on employers. In 2013, Oklahoma made a bold move and adopted the
Oklahoma Employee Injury Benefit Act (OEIBA) which enabled
employers to “opt-out” of Oklahoma’s workers’ compensation system if
they administered alternative benefit plans governed by the Employee
Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA). The plans allowed for the
retention of tort immunity for employers. Ultimately, the Oklahoma
Supreme Court held the OEIBA unconstitutional for violating the
Oklahoma Constitution’s ban on “special laws.”
This article outlines three distinct historical eras of state workers’
compensation and argues that we have now entered a fourth era, defined
by the pursuit of state workers’ compensation alternatives. By
evaluating the successful legal challenges to the OEIBA, this article
contemplates the feasibility of ERISA-governed alternative benefit plans
and whether they can effectively retain workers’ compensation tort
immunity and divest states from meaningful oversight of injured worker
benefits.

INTRODUCTION
It is odd to think that after one hundred years of workers’
compensation, employers and employees are still fighting over how to pay
 Daniel E. Walker is appellate counsel for the State Accident Insurance Fund Corporation

(SAIF) and represents the state of Oregon as a Special Assistant Attorney General in workers’
compensation matters. Daniel thanks Katharine Shove and the Western New England Law
Review for their thoughtful work preparing this Article for publication.
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benefits for injured workers. Over the last century, labor and industry
have welcomed new parties to the dispute, such as national insurance
companies, third-party claim administrators, dedicated workers’
compensation managed care organizations (MCOs), independent medical
examination companies, and numerous consultants. With fifty states
approaching workers’ compensation in fifty distinct and complex ways,1
it is easy to see how even defenders of workers’ compensation have
described the system as a “waste of time and money, [with] perverse
motivations on both sides.”2
The complexity and cost of workers’ compensation has led to
renewed scrutiny of the foundational tenants of a tort alternative, no-fault
benefit system. While worker advocate groups and claimant attorneys
have challenged the constitutionality of eroding worker benefits in state
courts on state and federal equal protection and due process grounds,
employers have successfully lobbied state legislatures for insurance
premium cost cutting measures.3
Most recently, the pursuit of deeper savings has led large national
employers to band together in search of cost-effective alternatives to state
workers’ compensation. This Article explores the “opt-out movement”
and the rise, fall, and likely return of alternative employee benefit systems.
I.

THE FIRST THREE ERAS OF WORKERS’ COMPENSATION

“Opt-out” is a process utilized by employers to remove themselves
from the workers’ compensation scheme through the implementation of

1. THOMAS J. KELLEHER ET AL., CONSTRUCTION DISPUTES PRAC. GUIDE WITH FORMS
§ 10.11 (2d ed. 2018).
2. David B. Torrey, The Opt-Out of Workers’ Compensation Legislation: A Critical
Briefing and the Vasquez v. Dillard’s Case (2016), 52 TORT TRIAL & INS. PRAC. L.J. 39, 68–
69 (2016).
3. Compare successful constitutional challenges to workers’ compensation statutes by
claimants, such as Castellanos v. Next Door Co., 192 So. 3d 431, 444 (Fla. 2016) (holding that
the Florida statute mandating a conclusive attorney fee schedule for workers’ compensation
claims was grossly inadequate and amounted to an unconstitutional violation of due process
under both state and federal constitutions); Rodriguez v. Brand W. Dairy, 378 P.3d 13, 32–33
(N.M. 2016) (declaring the exclusion of farmworkers from the New Mexico workers’
compensation statute unconstitutional); and Protz v. Workers’ Comp. Appeal Bd., 161 A.3d
827, 841 (Pa. 2017) (finding the Pennsylvanian workers’ compensation statute’s designation of
the AMA Guides to the Evaluation of Permanent Impairment for determining impairment an
unconstitutional delegation of legislative power); with legislative changes to curtail worker
benefits, such as 2017 Iowa Legis. Serv. ch. 23 (West) (enabling employers to apportion liability
from disability ratings to pre-existing injuries or prior employers); and 2017 N.Y. Sess. Laws
ch. 59, pt. NNN, § 15(3)(w) (McKinney).
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employer administered “alternative benefit plans.”4 These plans give
employers the freedom to devise their own system in order to deliver and
adjudicate injured worker benefits with minimal oversight by state
agencies. Companies that build and administer opt-out plans in Texas
began to lobby for the introduction of opt-out legislation in states that
historically required employers to cover injured workers under state
workers’ compensation statutes.5 The goal of such alternative benefit
plans is to provide a cheaper free market alternative to state workers’
compensation insurance and, if possible, retain tort immunity for
employers.6
It is important to understand the etiology of American workers’
compensation law and the inadequate tort system it replaced to recognize
what is at stake in the opt-out debate. Workers’ compensation law has
gone through three distinct eras marked by substantial change in the
balance of worker benefits. The first era began with the adoption of
compulsory state statutory workers’ compensation schemes, followed by
a second era of reforms during the Nixon administration and, most
recently, a third era defined by rising premium costs and broad statutory
claw backs of worker benefits.7
As this Article argues, we have embarked on a fourth era of workers’
compensation—one defined by large national employers’ concerted
efforts to create parallel benefit plans separate from state workers’
compensation schemes. While the Oklahoma Supreme Court decision in
Vasquez v. Dillard’s, Inc. exposed a myriad of problems with divorcing
injured worker benefits from state workers’ compensation,8 it is likely that
over the next decade, many state legislatures will continue to consider

4. Michael C. Duff, Are Workers’ Compensation “Alternative Benefit Plans” Authorized
by State Opt-Out Schemes Covered by ERISA?, 45 BRIEF 22, 29 (2016).
5. Molly Redden, Walmart, Lowe’s, Safeway, and Nordstrom Are Bankrolling a
Nationwide Campaign to Gut Workers’ Comp, MOTHER JONES (Mar. 26, 2015, 3:47 PM),
https://www.motherjones.com/politics/2015/03/arawc-walmart-campaign-against-workerscompensation [https://perma.cc/S6ED-YKKY].
6. See Howard Berkes & Michael Grabell, Opt-Out Plans Let Companies Work Without
Workers’ Comp, NPR: MORNING EDITION (Oct. 14, 2015, 5:01 AM), https://www.npr.org/
2015/10/14/448544926/texas-oklahoma-permit-companies-to-dump-worker-compensationplans [https://perma.cc/9PQL-T7SB].
7. See Alternative Benefit Systems and the Future of Workers’ Compensation, LEGAL
TALK NETWORK: WORKERS COMP MATTERS (Aug. 25, 2016), https://legaltalknetwork.com/
podcasts/workers-comp-matters/2016/08/alternative-benefit-systems-future-workerscompensation/ [https://perma.cc/KS2Z-F5QP] [hereinafter Alternative Benefit Systems]
(discussing the prior three eras of workers’ compensation).
8. Vasquez v. Dillard’s, Inc., 381 P.3d 768, 768 (Okla. 2016).
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business friendly “alternative benefit plans” as a cost-effective solution to
rising cost of workers’ compensation premiums.
A. The Plight of Injured Workers Prior to State-Mandated Workers’
Compensation
Prior to 1911, an injured worker seeking a remedy for an industrial
accident was required to bring grievances in civil court under commonlaw tort, often negligence. To succeed in their suit, a worker would have
to establish that its employer failed to act with “due care” to prevent an
injury or death to the worker and this negligence was the proximate cause
of the worker’s injury.9 An employer could evince due care in the
workplace by enforcing safety rules, providing safety equipment, warning
employees of potential dangers, and hiring “suitable and sufficient”
workers.10 If the fact finder determined the employer did not satisfy this
standard of care, the employer could be considered negligent and liable
for damages.11
Over time, the common-law system began to favor employers
through the development of three defenses to employer negligence: fellow
servant exception, assumption of the risk, and contributory negligence.12
Established in the English common law case of Butterfield v.
Forrester,13 and adopted in nineteenth-century America, contributory

9. Price V. Fishback & Shawn Everett Kantor, The Adoption of Workers’ Compensation
in the United States, 1900–1930, 41 J.L. & ECON. 305, 308 (1998).
10. Id. at n.4 (citing WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC
STRUCTURE OF TORT LAW 85–87 (1987)).
11. Id. at 308.
12. John S. Haller, Jr., Industrial Accidents—Worker Compensation Laws and the
Medical Response, 148 W. J. MED. 341, 342 (1988). When scrutinizing tort law, and any law
that motivates behavior, it is important to consider the economic incentives that drive individual
or collective choice. From a workplace safety perspective, common-law tort does not
incentivize employers to create a safe work place for their employees. Uninformed workers
will often take on more risk in their workplace environment than is economically efficient. This
allows the employer to shift accident costs to the worker. Therefore, under tort law, employers
are incentivized to be as negligent as fiscally reasonable while their employees shoulder the
brunt of financial exposure. Furthermore, negligence, unlike no-fault liability, is fraught with
caveats that sophisticated parties can mechanize as defenses to liability. See Keith N. Hylton &
Steven E. Laymon, The Internalization Paradox and Workers’ Compensation, 21 HOFSTRA L.
REV. 109, 141 (1992).
13. Butterfield v. Forrester (1809) 103 Eng. Rep. 926, 927. The case illustrates the
casualness with which the doctrine of contributory negligence entered the common law. See
Francis H. Bohlen, Contributory Negligence, 21 HARV. L. REV. 233, 233 (1908).
There is . . . no discussion of general principles, no logical argument applying such
principles to the particular facts and showing that they necessitate the result
reached by the court. All attempts to ascertain upon what legal principle the
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negligence precluded workers from monetary recovery from work place
injuries if they were found, in any way, negligently responsible for the
injury.14 Employers were empowered to wield contributory negligence as
a defense irrespective of job hazards or the percentage of negligence
assigned the worker.15 Viewed today by most courts as a harsh result,
pure contributory negligence has only survived for tort claims in a handful
of jurisdictions.16
The fellow servant rule discharged an employer from liability for
workplace injuries “where the injury occurred as a result of the negligence
of a coemployee engaged in the same common or general employment.”17
Some commentators have ascribed the adoption of the fellow servant rule
in America as the judiciary’s attempt to protect industry during the
industrial revolution.18
Assumption of risk, the third defense doctrine, was utilized in
nineteenth-century employment contracts as a waiver of liability for
employers.19 The principle held that, either expressed in writing or
implied through actions, workers knowingly assume the risks associated
with the employment and therefore waive their rights to sue their
defense of contributory negligence is based, are therefore efforts ex post facto, to
explain and account for a result already reached apparently unconsciously.
Id.
14. See Gary T. Schwartz, Contributory and Comparative Negligence: A Reappraisal, 87
YALE L.J. 697, 719 (1978).
15. A booming hazardous industry of the nineteenth century, railroads were notorious for
using contributory negligence as a defense to liability. See Pa. R.R. v. Aspell, 23 Pa. 147, 149–
50 (1854) (“It has been a rule of law from time immemorial, and is not likely to be changed in
all time to come, that there can be no recovery for an injury caused by the mutual default of both
parties.”).
16. Alabama, Maryland, North Carolina, Virginia, and the District of Columbia still
prescribe to pure contributory negligence. See generally, e.g., John R. Cowley & Bros., Inc. v.
Brown, 569 So.2d 375, 381 (Ala. 1990); Ala. Power Co. v. Scholz, 215 So.2d 447, 451 (Ala.
1968); Wingfield v. Peoples Drug Store, 379 A.2d 685 (D.C. 1977); Bd. of Cty. Comm’r v. Bell
Atlantic, 695 A.2d 171, 180 (Md. 1997); Smith v. Fiber Controls Corp., 268 S.E.2d 504, 506
(N.C. 1980); Baskett v. Banks, 45 S.E.2d 173, 177 (Va. 1947).
17. BARRY A. LINDAHL, 4 MODERN TORT LAW: LIABILITY AND LITIGATION § 43:9 (2d
ed.). This rule was first pronounced in the English common law court in Priestley v. Fowler
(1837) 150 Eng. Rep. 1030, 1032–33, and subsequently used in the United States, in Murray v.
S.C. R.R., 26 S.C.L. (1 McMul.) 385, 400 (1841). Monique N. Thoresz, Note, Cooper v. City
of New York: The Fellow Servant Rule—Wanted Dead or Alive, 15 PACE L. REV. 911, 914
(1995).
18. See Comment, The Creation of a Common Law Rule: The Fellow Servant Rule, 1837–
1860, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 579, 580–81 (1984); Thoresz, supra note 17, at 914.
19. Assumption of risk is sometimes colloquially referred to as “the worker’s right to die”
or “death contracts.” See Gregory P. Guyton, A Brief History of Workers’ Compensation, 19
IOWA ORTHOPEDIC J. 106, 106–07 (1999).
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employer for injuries associated with the employment. The wide latitude
given to the assumption of risk defense aided expanding industries during
the industrial revolution, allowing them to sidestep bearing the business
cost of “human overhead.”20
B. The First Era: Reform and the “Grand Bargain”
By the early twentieth century, the imbalance between employer
protections and worker remedies began to pique the attention of activists
and media outlets to look towards Germany as a potential model for an
American workers’ compensation system.21
Unlike Germany, where compulsory insurance for injured workers
was created and facilitated by the national government, United States
federalism principles fostered a patchwork of competing state laws.22
Industry as a whole was opposed to state-by-state regulation that would
allow competitors in unregulated jurisdictions an economic advantage.23
In response, in 1910, a conference convened in Chicago between
representatives of state labor commissions and industry leaders to address
the lack of uniformity in state laws and produce a uniform workmen’s
compensation law.24
State legislatures responded narrowly at first by creating accident
funds for certain occupations, such as for miners in Maryland25 and
Montana,26 and compulsory insurance coverage for a wide range of
dangerous occupations in New York.27 These legislative attempts were
dismantled by their respective state courts on both federal and state
constitutional grounds.28 State judiciaries were specifically worried with
the idea of employer liability without fault, which the Court of Appeals of
New York described, pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment, as “taking

20. Tiller v. Atl. Coast Line R.R., 318 U.S. 54, 59 (1943).
21. LEX K. LARSON & ARTHUR LARSON, WORKERS’ COMPENSATION LAW: CASES,
MATERIALS, AND TEXT 20–21 (5th ed. 2013); Guyton, supra note 19, at 107–08.
22. See Haller, supra note 12, at 341–43. In one example, phosphorus match
manufacturers openly testified before Congress that, irrespective of the widespread poisoning
of their workers, they refused to invest in alternative compounds unless every state mandated it.
Id.
23. Id. at 343.
24. See JAMES HARRINGTON BOYD, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF COMPENSATION FOR
INJURIES TO WORKMEN 17–22 (1913) (providing an account of this conference).
25. Act of Apr. 1, ch. 139, 1902 Md. Laws 218.
26. 1909 Mont. Laws Ch. 67.
27. 1910 N.Y. Laws 1633–37.
28. LARSON & LARSON, supra note 21, at 17.
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the property of A. and giving it to B., and that cannot be done under our
Constitutions.”29
Concerned that passing compulsory workers’ compensation schemes
would raise constitutional concerns under the Takings Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment, states passed voluntary, non-compulsory
workers’ compensation laws. These statutes did not compel employers to
participate in workers’ compensation schemes; however, employers who
chose not to participate in their state’s scheme were left open to civil
liability.30
This changed in 1917, with the Supreme Court case New York Central
Railroad Co. v. White.31 In his opinion, Justice Pitney not only dismantled
any Fourteenth Amendment procedural due process concerns surrounding
no-fault workers’ compensation32 but also outlined the necessity of a quid
pro quo arrangement between labor and industry.33 As discussed in Part
III of this Article, the foundation of the Court’s opinion and the necessity
of the quid pro quo arrangement are directly challenged by the opt-out
movement.34
With the constitutionality of compulsory workers’ compensation
decided by New York Central Railroad Co., states began rapidly adopting
and refining workers’ compensation schemes. By the conclusion of 1920,
forty-two states had enacted workers’ compensation statutes.35 The last

29. Ives v. S. Buffalo Ry. Co., 94 N.E. 431, 440 (N.Y. 1911).
30. See LARSON & LARSON, supra note 21, at 22.
31. See N.Y. Cent. R.R. v. White, 243 U.S. 188, 203–05 (1917).
32. Id. at 196, 204–05. Justice Pitney explains that employee injury is a “probable and
foreseen result” of an employer’s business and, therefore, no-fault liability does not implicate
the Fifth Amendment. Id. at 205.
33. Id. at 203–04. Justice Pitney elegantly outlines the quid pro quo trade-off of workers’
compensation by arguing that it is practical pursuant to natural justice.
[I]t is not unreasonable for the state . . . to require [the employer] to contribute a
reasonable amount and according to a reasonable and definite scale, by way of
compensation for the loss of earning power incurred in the common enterprise,
irrespective of the question of negligence, instead of leaving the entire loss to rest
where it may chance to fall,— [sic] that is, upon the injured employee or his
dependents.
Id. at 203.
34. See infra Part III.
35. Christopher J. Boggs, Workers’ Compensation History: The Great Tradeoff!, INS. J.
(Mar. 19, 2015), https://www.insurancejournal.com/blogs/academy-journal/2015/03/19/
360273.htm [https://perma.cc/A7VU-PV74]. Alaska and Hawaii both enacted workers’
compensation statutes prior to 1920 but were not recognized as states until 1959. Id.
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state to enact a workers’ compensation statute was Mississippi, which held
out until 1948.36
State court systems took a narrow view of what type of injuries should
be covered during the early days of workers’ compensation.37 Over time,
workers’ compensation law evolved to encompass not only accidental
injuries but also occupational diseases and stress-related mental
disabilities.38
C. The Second Era: Involvement of the Federal Government
Whether due to states’ concerns for their own citizens or the
administrative costs associated with federal preemption, workers’
compensation has always been regulated and administered by the states.
As such, the procedural process and benefits available to injured workers
is not uniform among the states.39
After sixty years of workers’ compensation, it became apparent that
many, if not most, state workers’ compensation systems were not
delivering statutorily promised benefits in a fair and effective manner as
they were designed to do.40 The federal government, through the National
Commission on State Workmen’s Compensation Laws (“Commission”)
submitted a report in 1972 on the state of workers’ compensation.41 The
Commission, which was made up of a wide variety of industry, labor,
medical and insurance parties, proposed essential elements for all state
workers’ compensation schemes.42 The report urged the states to adopt

36. Id.
37. Thomas S. Cook, Workers’ Compensation and Stress Claims: Remedial Intent and
Restrictive Application, 62 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 879, 883–84 (1986). Early workers’
compensation only covered “sudden, unexpected, incidents attributable to a specific time and
place.” Id. at 884–85.
38. See id. at 886–89.
39. See Workers’ Compensation Law—State by State Comparison, NFIB (June 7, 2017)
https://www.nfib.com/content/legal-compliance/legal/workers-compensation-laws-state-bystate-comparison-57181/ [https://perma.cc/N5BH-YUUP] (showing the substantive and
procedural differences between how the states approach workers’ compensation).
40. Alternative Benefit Systems, supra note 7 (“[W]hen the workers’ comp[.] law was first
enacted in New York, the Supreme Court said that the workers’ comp[.] laws must provide
significant benefits to the injured workers. And when we got into the 1960s and early 1970s,
many states’ benefits were not significant.”).
41. See LARSON & LARSON, supra note 21, at 24. Congress created the Commission
through the Occupational Health and Safety Act of 1970 (OSHA). Members of the fifteenperson board were appointed by the president. Id.
42. See generally REPORT OF THE NAT’L COMM’N ON STATE WORKMEN’S COMP. LAWS.
NO. 72–600195 5–6 (1972) [hereinafter NAT’L COMM’N]. A total of twenty or so
recommendations were submitted in whole. Id. Some of these elements included:
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the Commission’s suggestions and dangled the prospect of federal action
if none was taken by 1975.43
“State legislators took the Commission’s [proposals] seriously” and
most of the states retooled their workers’ compensation statutes to address
the Commission’s report.44 Annexation of workers’ compensation into
the federal administrative state would effectively eliminate, to some
degree, the private insurance market and create a Social Security-like
benefit system administered by the federal government. Multiple bills
were put to Congress to implement minimum standards for state workers’
compensation statutes, some of which were beyond the recommendations
of the Commission.45 None were successful.
The changes adopted by the states as a result of the Commission’s
report marked what some have called “the most dramatic liberalization
[by the states] of state compensation statutes in history.” 46 The political
pendulum had swung, this time in favor of injured workers.
By the late 1960s, private pension plans had grown in popularity with
employers as a “way[] to augment compensation in the face of wage and
price controls.”47 Concerned with the mismanagement, financial stability,
and oversight of private benefit plans, Congress passed the Employee
Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) of 1974.48 ERISA brought
comprehensive changes for all employee benefit plans provided by private
employers or employee organizations by imposing “a uniform set of
[C]ompulsory coverage in all acts; elimination of all numerical and occupational
exemptions to coverage; . . . full coverage of work-related diseases; full medical
and physical rehabilitation services without arbitrary limits; a broad extraterritoriality provision; elimination of arbitrary limits on duration of total sum of
benefits; and a weekly benefit maximum that rises from an immediate [sixty-six
and two-thirds] percent to an ultimate [two hundred] percent of average weekly
wage in the state.
LARSON & LARSON, supra note 21, at 24.
43. JAMES ROBERT CHELIUS, WORKPLACE SAFETY AND HEALTH: THE ROLE OF
WORKERS’ COMPENSATION 49 (1977).
44. See Joan T. A. Gabel, Escalating Inefficiency in Workers’ Compensation Systems: Is
Federal Reform the Answer?, 34 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1083, 1087–88 (1999).
45. Scott D. Szymendera, Workers’ Compensation: Overview and Issues, CONG. RES.
SERV. 1, 20–21 (2017). “In 1973, S. 2088, introduced by Senators Harrison Williams and Jacob
Javits, would have created minimum standards for state workers’ compensation systems” which
required, among other things, “no duration or monetary limit on total disability benefits paid;
[and] no duration or monetary limit on medical or rehabilitation benefits.” Id. at 24.
46. LARSON & LARSON, supra note 21, at 24.
47. Stephen E. Ehlers & David R. Wise, So What’s ERISA All About?: A Concise Guide
for Labor and Employment Attorneys, 77 N.Y. ST. B. ASS’N J. 22, 22 (2005).
48. Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93–406, 88 Stat. 829
(1974).
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requirements regarding standards of conduct, responsibility, and
obligations under such plans.”49
Plans governed by ERISA fall into two categories: pension plans and
welfare plans. Pension plans provide retirement income to employees or
allow for deferred income,50 whereas welfare plans include most other
employee benefits.51 Generally, employee benefit plans regulated by
ERISA are plans provided by “a single employer, by groups of employers
(multiple employer plans) and by unions and employers together (multiemployer plans),” while government and church plans are generally
exempt.52
ERISA gets it teeth from the act’s far-reaching preemption scheme.53
If a benefit plan falls within ERISA, there is the potential for a host of
state laws that would normally apply to be preempted.54 ERISA does
carve out an exemption for state laws that regulate insurance.55 Though,
self-insured benefit plans are considered outside of state laws that regulate
insurance and thus are entitled to ERISA preemption.56
At issue in this Article is ERISA’s relationship with workers’
compensation. By the time of ERISA’s adoption in 1974, almost every
state required employers to either purchase workers’ compensation plans
or self-insure their employees pursuant to state workers’ compensation

49. KATHRYN J. KENNEDY & PAUL T. SHULTZ III, EMPLOYEE BENEFITS LAW:
QUALIFICATIONS AND ERISA REQUIREMENTS 1 (2012).
50. 29 U.S.C. § 1002(2)(A) (2018).
51. Id. § 1002(1) (including in the welfare plan benefits classes such as medical, sickness,
accident, disability, death, unemployment, vacation benefits, apprenticeship, training programs,
day care centers, scholarship funds, and prepaid legal services).
52. Ehlers & Wise, supra note 47, at 23; see 29 U.S.C. § 1002(32)–(33) (providing the
definition of “government plan” and “church plan”).
53. Generally, “[f]ederal preemption is the [negation] of state laws that conflict with
federal law.” NICOLE HUBERFELD ET AL., THE LAW OF AMERICAN HEALTH CARE 177 (2017).
The doctrine is based on the Supremacy Clause. See U.S. CONST. art. VI, para. 2. Preemption
is accomplished in three ways: (1) Congress has used express statutory language to preempt
state law, (2) Congress has implied preemption when compliance with both state and federal
law would lead to an absurd result, or (3) if Congress has so regulated a specific field the courts
may conclude that federal law “occupies the field” and there is no room for state regulation.
HUBERFELD, supra.
54. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (2018) (“[ERISA] shall supersede any and all State laws insofar
as they may now or hereafter relate to any employee benefit plan . . . .”); see also HUBERFELD,
supra note 53.
55. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(2)(A) (“[N]othing in this subchapter shall be construed to exempt
or relieve any person from any law of any State which regulates insurance, banking, or
securities.”).
56. UNUM Life Ins. Co. v. Ward, 526 U.S. 358, 367 n.2 (1999) (“Self-insured ERISA
plans . . . are generally sheltered from state insurance regulation.”).
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statutes.57 Congress explicitly excluded employee benefit plans from
ERISA that were “maintained solely for the purpose of complying with
applicable workmen’s compensation laws or unemployment
compensation or disability insurance laws.”58 By excluding workers’
compensation from ERISA, states continued to have complete control
over the procedures and adjudication of workers’ compensation benefits.
D. The Third Era: Addressing Rising Employer Costs
Since the codification of workers’ compensation by the states,
concerns over the quality and accessibility of worker benefits have often
been considered secondary to the cost of workers’ compensation
insurance premiums for employers.59 State legislatures have regularly
taken the stance that workers’ compensation is a burden on employers
instead of viewing it as a negotiated bargain with workers. 60 Therefore,
the cost of workers’ compensation assumed by employers often incites
more conversation than benefits forfeited by injured workers.61
Prior to the 1970s, workers’ compensation insurance (or the costs
associated with being self-insured) was not a high-line item on employer
budgets.62 With the expansion of benefits, the type of workers covered,
and ballooning health care costs, state legislatures began feeling pressure

57. LARSON & LARSON, supra note 21, at 23–24 (noting that by 1949 every state in the
lower forty-eight had adopted workers’ compensation acts except Mississippi).
58. 29 U.S.C. § 1003(b)(3) (2018).
59. See Martha T. McCluskey, The Illusion of Efficiency in Workers’ Compensation
“Reform”, 50 RUTGERS L. REV. 657, 690 (1998) (arguing that states have disproportionately
addressed workers’ compensation regarding the “impact of workers’ compensation costs on
their state’s ‘business climate’” over the adequacy of injured worker benefits).
60. See Press Release, George A. Amedore, Jr., N.Y. State Senator, Senators Call for
Sensible Workers’ Comp Reform in Budget (Mar. 22, 2017) https://www.nysenate.gov/
newsroom/press-releases/george-amedore-jr/senators-call-sensible-workers-comp-reformbudget [https://perma.cc/2CGX-NGQJ]. New York senate assembly member John T.
McDonald III has recently stated, “[e]mployers, small and large, continue to struggle with the
high cost burden of workers’ compensation cost. It is the number one or two concern in their
business.” Id.
61. See McCluskey, supra note 59, at 681 (1998). “[T]he original workers’ compensation
bargain was distorted [during the 1970’s and 1980’s] because of an expansion of workers’
benefits and the increased costs of administering a system with more generous benefits covering
a wide range of injuries” which subsequently lead states to implement cost cutting mechanisms.
Id.
62. See Leslie I. Boden, Workers’ Compensation in the United States: High Costs, Low
Benefits, 16 ANN. REV. PUB. HEALTH 189, 190 (1995) (describing how many state legislatures
began to focus on the adequacy of worker benefits in the 1970s, which resulted in the average
worker’s compensation cost to grow from 1.1% to 2.6% of payroll).
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to address employer concerns over rising premiums.63 Some states, such
as Oregon, introduced higher legal burdens for workers to establish the
compensability of certain injuries.64 Access to workers’ compensation
benefits was further curtailed by the introduction of managed care
organizations (MCOs) to contain health costs and the passage of statutory
measures aimed at reducing attorney involvement in claim litigation.65
II. THE FOURTH ERA AND THE OPT-OUT MOVEMENT
Unlike the past three eras of workers’ compensation, when worker
benefits and employer costs were negotiated within the confines of state
statutes, the fourth era is marked by large employers pushing legislation
that exempts participation within such statutes through ERISA
preemption. As discussed below in this Part, parties have successfully
invoked state constitutional doctrines, such as equal protection and the
prohibition against special laws, to protect workers’ compensation statutes
from ERISA preemption.
A. Alternative Benefit Plans in Texas
The origin of the opt-out movement can be traced to Texas. While
Texas does have a workers’ compensation statute administered by the
Texas Workers’ Compensation Commission, it is the only state where
workers’ compensation is not compulsory under state statute.66 Texas
63. See McCluskey, supra note 59, at 705–06.
64. In occupational disease claims, the worker must prove the work exposure is the “major
contributing cause,” or fifty-one percent or more of the cause, of the condition. If at any time
an injury combines with a qualified preexisting condition the worker must show that the injury
was the “major contributing cause” of the “combined condition.” OR. REV. STAT.
§ 656.005(7)(a) (2018) (“[T]he combined condition is compensable only if . . . the otherwise
compensable injury is the major contributing cause of the disability of the combined
condition . . . .”). Compared with the “material cause” standard in which a condition is
compensable if the injury played a “material” role in the condition. The adoption of the “major
contributing cause” standard in occupational diseases and combined conditions blocked claims
from ever entering the workers’ compensation system, effectively leaving workplace injuries
that do not meet the burden without a remedy. Vigor Indus., LLC v. Ayres, 310 P.3d 674, 676,
681 (Or. Ct. App. 2013) (holding that the major contributing cause of a combined condition was
when the injury is a greater cause than the qualified preexisting condition).
65. For example, legislation in Oregon from the 1980s to 1996 reduced the number of
claims by twelve to twenty-four percent and benefits by twenty to twenty-five percent. Terry
Thomason & John F. Burton, Jr., The Effects of Changes in the Oregon Workers’ Compensation
Program on Employees’ Benefits and Employers’ Costs, 1 WORKERS’ COMPENSATION POL’Y
REV. 7, 10 (August 7, 2001), made available at http://workerscompresources.com/wp-content/
uploads/2012/11/JA01.pdf.
66. TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. § 406.002(a) (West 2017) (“Except for public employers and
as otherwise provided by law, an employer may elect to obtain workers’ compensation
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employers may elect to pass on workers’ compensation coverage, though
they forfeit tort immunity by doing so.67 Therefore, if a Texas employer
runs a cost-benefit analysis and decides that the cost of workers’
compensation insurance outweighs exposure to civil litigation costs and
tort damages, he may pass on the exclusive remedy of workers’
compensation.
Since the 1980s, self-insured plans utilizing ERISA have been
available in the Texas market.68 To utilize these plans, employers would
elect against Texas workers’ compensation coverage and become nonsubscribing employers.69 Normally, non-subscribing employers under
Texas law are exposed to tort liability.70 In order to minimize this liability,
non-subscribing employers conditioned employment on the acceptance of
arbitration agreements for common law claims.71 Texas courts upheld
these agreements based on the reasoning in West Texas Express v.
Guerrero, that an “arbitration agreement . . . did not actually waive
[claimant’s] right to sue, [and that the claimant] merely agreed to a
particular forum for resolution of his cause of action.”72 Commentators
have further noted that these arbitration agreements are possible in Texas
because the Texas courts have held that “when [what amounts to] a preinjury waiver of common law claims is included in an arbitration

insurance coverage.”) (emphasis added); Kirk D. Willis, Why Smart Employers Opt Out from
Texas Workers’ Compensation Coverage Under V.T.C.A. Labor Code § 406.002(A), 38 T.
MARSHALL L. REV. 117, 120 (2012) (noting that Texas is the only state that does not require
employers to subscribe to workers’ compensation).
67. See Willis, supra note 66, at 125 (explaining that an employer who chooses against
providing workers’ compensation coverage for their employees (referred to under Texas law as
a “nonsubscriber”) “is subject to negligence liability associated with a work[place] injury”).
68. PETER ROUSMANIERE & JACK ROBERTS, WORKERS’ COMPENSATION OPT-OUT: CAN
PRIVATIZATION WORK? 1, 45–46 (2012), http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/files/wc-opt-outreport-11-2012.pdf [https://perma.cc/PME2-WRJF].
69. TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. § 406.005 (West 2017) (describing the Texas statutory
mechanism to become a non-subscribing employer).
70. See Taff v. Singer Sewing Mach. Co., 331 F.2d 405, 406–07 (5th Cir. 1964).
Under Texas law, an employee is allowed to sue [an] employer in tort for injuries
caused by the employer’s negligence, if the employer while eligible to subscribe
to the Texas Workmen’s Compensation system has chosen not to do so. In such
case, a defendant employer is deprived of the traditional common law defenses of
contributory negligence, assumed risk, and follow-servant [sic] rule.
Id.; see TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. § 406.033 (West 2017).
71. See Jason Ohana, Texas Elective Workers’ Compensation: A Model of Innovation?, 2
WM. & MARY BUS. L. REV. 323, 343–44 (2011); Nathan E. Ross, How Level is the Playing
Field? Should Employers Be Able to Circumvent State Workers’ Compensation Schemes by
Creating Their Own Employee Compensation Plans?, 2000 J. DISP. RESOL. 439, 439, 442–43
(2000).
72. W. Tex. Express v. Guerrero, 511 S.W.3d 106, 117 (Tex. App. 2014).
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agreement, the [Texas] statutory prohibition against pre-injury waivers is
preempted by the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA).”73
Functionally, at will employees who sign employment arbitration
agreements are precluded from bringing negligence suits for on-the-job
injuries in civil court.74 Furthermore, since the employers in these
scenarios have opted out of workers’ compensation coverage, their injured
workers are precluded from seeking benefits under the Texas workers’
compensation statute. As a result, an injured worker’s only path to a
remedy is to go through arbitration under the employer’s alternative
benefit plan.
Unsurprisingly, large employers with the resources to put together
self-insured alternative benefit plans found instant savings on insurance
premiums or the cost associated with being self-insured under the Texas
workers’ compensation statute.75 Alternative benefit plans operate much
like other benefit offerings (such as retirement plans, group-term life
insurance plans and health plans), and, due to ERISA preemption, the state
is unable to effectively regulate the contents of the plan.76
B. The Oklahoma Employee Injury Benefit Act
While some states, such as Oregon, have successfully curbed
premiums, many states struggle with rising workers’ compensation
costs.77 With an environment ripe for further legislative intervention, the
door was open for changes in states that wanted to promote a pro-business
environment to attract large employers.

73. Ohana, supra note 71, at 344; see In re Bison Bldg. Materials, Ltd., Nos. 01-07-00003CV, 01-07-00029-CV, 2008 WL 2548568, at *10 (Tex. App. June 26, 2008) (“We . . . now hold
that the FAA preempts any potential application of the Texas non-waiver provision stated in
Labor Code section 406.033(e) to prevent enforcement of the arbitration clause stated in [the
Labor Code].”); In re Border Steel, Inc., 229 S.W.3d 825, 832 (Tex. App. 2007) (“[T]he FAA
preempts the application of the Texas non-waiver provision to prevent the enforcement of the
Arbitration Agreement at issue here.”).
74. See sources cited supra note 73.
75. Torrey, supra note 2, at 44; see Alison D. Morantz, Opting Out of Workers’
Compensation in Texas: A Survey of Large, Multistate Nonsubscribers, in REGULATION VS.
LITIGATION: PERSPECTIVES FROM ECONOMICS AND LAW 197, 199–200 (Daniel P. Kessler ed.,
2010).
76. See Section II.C.
77. See CHRIS DAY ET AL., DEP’T. OF CONSUMER & BUS. SERVS., 2016 OREGON
WORKERS’
COMPENSATION
PREMIUM
RATE
RANKING
SUMMARY
(2016),
https://www.oregon.gov/dcbs/reports/Documents/general/prem-sum/16-2082.pdf
[https://perma.cc/S5HD-25Q6]. California, the state with most expensive index rate at $3.24
per $100 of payroll, is at 176 percent of the median compared to North Dakota, the state with
the least expensive index rate at $0.89 per $100 of payroll, at 48 percent of the mean.
Oklahoma’s index rate is at $2.23 per $100 of payroll and 121 percent of the mean. Id.
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It is with this backdrop that, in 2011, Oklahoma Governor Mary
Fallin appointed a working group to examine and rewrite Oklahoma’s
Workers’ Compensation Act. The working group was tasked with
codifying case law that had developed since the 1977’s workers’
compensation reforms.78 Through the working group’s efforts and
without much controversy, Oklahoma Senate Bill 878 was created and
eventually passed as the Oklahoma Workers’ Compensation Code.79
Proponents of Texas-like workers’ compensation alternative benefit
plans began lobbying for an opt-out alternative in Oklahoma before the
full effects of the new Workers’ Compensation Code could be felt.80 In
2013, their efforts proved successful when Oklahoma passed the
Oklahoma Employee Injury Benefit Act (OEIBA), also referred to as the
Opt-Out Act.81 The OEIBA allowed employers who were certified as
“qualified employers” to remove themselves from Oklahoma’s workers’
compensation system if they set up written benefit plans to cover work
injuries for employees.82 The requirements for becoming a “qualified
employer” included providing a written private benefit plan to the
Insurance Commissioner and paying an annual $1,500 filing fee.83 Unlike
Texas, “qualified employer[s]” retained the same tort immunity held by
employers who remained under Oklahoma workers’ compensation
statute.84

78. Bob Burke, The Evolution of Workers’ Compensation Law in Oklahoma: Is the Grand
Bargain Still Alive?, 41 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 337, 392 (2016).
79. 2011 Okla. Sess. Laws 2553 (repealed 2013); see Tish Sommer, Bill Summary, OKLA.
WORKERS’ COMP. CT. OF EXISTING CLAIMS (June 1, 2011), http://www.owcc.state.ok.us/
PDF/LegChanges/SB878_Summary%20of%20Enacted_FINAL.pdf [https://perma.cc/SFH8NSD6] (providing a section-by-section explanation of the Workers’ Compensation Code). At
the time, Sommer was Special Counsel for the Workers’ Compensation Court. Administrative
Law Judges, OKLA. WORKERS COMPENSATION COMM’N, https://www.ok.gov/wcc/
About_the_Commission/Administrative_Law_Judge_Bios/ [https://perma.cc/LK6S-5GA8].
80. See Burke, supra note 78, at 413–16 (noting that the legislative changes were driven
by many of Oklahoma’s largest employers, such as Hobby Lobby, Quick Trip, Sysco, Dollar
General, Auto Zone and Best Buy).
81. Id. at 414–15.
82. OKLA. STAT. tit. 85A, § 202 (2018), invalidated by Vasquez v. Dillard’s Inc., 381 P.3d
768 (Okla. 2016).
83. Id. § 202(B); see also ROUSMANIERE & ROBERTS, supra note 68, at 58.
84. OKLA. STAT. tit. 85A, § 209(B) (2018), invalidated by Vasquez v. Dillard’s Inc., 381
P.3d 768 (Okla. 2016) (“[A] qualified employer is only subject to liability in any action brought
by a covered employee or his or her dependent family members for injury resulting from an
occupational injury if the injury is the result of an intentional tort on the part of the qualified
employer.”).
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C. The Allure of Opt-Out
State workers’ compensation schemes are often singled out by probusiness advocates as inefficient, costly, and easily abused by workers.85
Besides cost savings for employers, opt-out proponents have argued that
alternative benefit plans are superior to state workers’ compensation
systems for the following reasons: management of medical treatment,
employee accountability, competition of differing plans, and removal
from bureaucratic administrative law proceedings.86 Yet the true selling
point of opt-out plans for large employers is that they provide what
effectively functions as employer-controlled arbitration of personal injury
tort claims.
The legality and proliferation of workplace arbitration agreements, as
noted in Texas, is nothing new.87 The Supreme Court’s 2012 enunciation
in Marmet Health Care Center, Inc. v. Brown that personal injury suits
could be covered by arbitration agreement further opened the door for the
opt-out movement.88 While scholars have noted that “[t]ort values are
difficult to square with notions of arbitration contracts”89 because of the
unknown “extent of a subsequently suffered injury,”90 recent Supreme
Court decisions upholding the Federal Arbitration Act in employment
contracts suggests arbitration may continue to expand into the tort realm.91

85. ROUSMANIERE & ROBERTS, supra note 68, at 6 (“The opt-out concept arises from
employers’ belief that statutory workers’ compensation systems are inherently and excessively
costly and burdened with fraud and abuse.”).
86. See Torrey, supra note 2, at 48–52.
87. See DirecTV, Inc. v. Imburgia, 136 S. Ct. 463, 471 (2015); Nitro-Lift Techs., LLC v.
Howard, 568 U.S. 17, 20–22 (2012); Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 218
(1985); Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 22–23 (1983), for
the U.S. Supreme Court’s long-held enforcement of arbitration agreements under the Federal
Arbitration Act; supra Section II.A.
88. Marmet Health Care Ctr., Inc. v. Brown, 565 U.S. 530, 533–34 (2012).
89. Michael C. Duff, Worse than Pirates or Prussian Chancellors: A State’s Authority to
Opt-Out of the Quid Pro Quo, 17 MARQ. BENEFITS & SOC. WELFARE L. REV. 123, 127 (2016)
[hereinafter Worse than Pirates]; see Elizabeth G. Thornburg, Contracting with Tortfeasors:
Mandatory Arbitration Clauses and Personal Injury Claims, 67 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 253,
273 (2004) (arguing that, taken to an extreme, the enforcement of arbitration clauses diminishes
tort policy considerations).
90. Worse than Pirates, supra note 89, at 127.
91. The Supreme Court’s decision in Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams held that the
Federal Arbitration Act, applied to all workers engaged in interstate commerce with the
exception of certain interstate transportation workers, such as railroad employees or seamen.
532 U.S. 105, 112 (2001); see Worse than Pirates, supra note 89, at 127 (“Even during the peak
of industrialism . . . some late nineteenth century courts refused to enforce pre-injury waivers
of tort suits.”); see also Richard A. Bales & Sue Irion, How Congress Can Make a More
Equitable Federal Arbitration Act, 113 PENN. ST. L. REV. 1081, 1085 (2009) (“Because the
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Opt-out plans also offer the solution of effectively stopping claims
from getting in the door. For example, opt-out plans try to remove benefit
plan claim disputes from oversight by independent state agencies through
ERISA preemption. Under the alternative benefit plans, injured workers
are required to appeal their denied claims to an arbitration committee
through a written appeal, often without the aid of a hearing or counsel.92
Unlike a neutral agency-employed Administrative Law Judge, who
reviews the facts surrounding a workplace injury through evidence and
testimony, opt-out plans allow the employer to appoint whomever they
want as the initial fact finder. This is problematic because appellate courts
often only retain de novo review of legal issues in a case and do not make
findings of fact. Often, on review in workers’ compensation cases, higher
courts are bound to a deferential standard of review of the administrative
fact finder, which makes the employer’s control of fact finding a powerful
tool.93
Since opt-out plans exist in a free market with firms vying for
business, plans are often crafted to be more competitive by limiting
benefits, employee rights, and medical care choices. For example, only
forty-one percent of Texas opt-out plans include death benefits for the
beneficiary of fatal claims.94 Even more concerning, one approved
Oklahoma opt-out plan required injured workers to report their injury to
the plan administrator within twenty-four hours or the injured worker

Court will not do it and the Court has determined that state legislatures cannot do it, any reform
of the current system regarding enforceable contracts and procedures governing arbitration must
come from Congress . . . .”) (emphasis omitted).
92. The Oklahoma Employee Injury Benefit Act states:
The claimant may appeal in writing an initial adverse benefit determination to an
appeals committee within one hundred eighty (180) days following his or her
receipt of the adverse benefit determination. The appeal shall be heard by a
committee consisting of at least three people that were not involved in the original
adverse benefit determination. The appeals committee shall not give any deference
to the claimant’s initial adverse benefit determination in its review.
OKLA. STAT. tit. 85A, § 211(B)(1) (2018), invalidated by Vasquez v. Dillard’s Inc., 381 P.3d
768 (Okla. 2016).
93. David B. Torrey, Master or Chancellor? The Workers’ Compensation Judge and
Adjudicatory Power, 32 J. NAT’L ASS’N ADMIN. L. JUDICIARY 21, 113–22 (2012) (describing
how, either through law or practice, appellate courts in multiple jurisdictions defer to the factual
findings of state commission charged with originally adjudicating workers’ compensation
cases).
94. Jay Root, Behind the Texas Miracle, a Broken System for Broken Workers, TEX. TRIB.
(June 29, 2014), http://apps.texastribune.org/hurting-for-work/ [https://perma.cc/FWZ4-E84K].
Michael Duff points out the irony as Texas is near the top of the national workplace death rates
in recent years. Worse than Pirates, supra note 89, at 137.
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would be procedurally barred from bringing the claim. 95 Effectively,
injured workers who did not know they were injured, or failed to
immediately attribute their injury to work, were barred from benefits
under their plan. Further, due to their employer’s tort immunity, workers
were barred from seeking civil damages.96
Opt-out plans were also used to drop some injuries that were covered
under Oklahoma’s workers’ compensation scheme. Under Oklahoma’s
workers’ compensation statute, “compensable injury” is defined as
injuries that occur during the course or in the scope of a worker’s
employment, with some minor exceptions.97 However, under opt-out
plans governed by the OIEBA, cumulative trauma injuries and
occupational exposure diseases, which meet the definition of
“compensable injury,” were allowed to be left off employer plans.98 For
example, an employer who manufactured toxic cleaning chemicals could
refuse to cover lung disease under its alterative benefit plan even though
chemical exposure to the lung is a foreseeable risk of employment.
Some scholars have argued that workers may fare better under some
private plans.99 For example, Alison Morantz points out that some Texas
private plans include “first-day coverage of lost earnings and wage
replacement rates that are not capped by the stte’s [sic] average weekly

95. Robert Wilson, The 24 Hour Oklahoma Opt Out Sham, WORKERS COMPENSATION
(Apr. 29, 2015, 5:21 PM), www.insurors.org/pdf/The-24-Hour-Oklahoma-Opt-Out-Sham.pdf
[https://perma.cc/LH7T-KSX3].
96. For example, in Oklahoma, Ms. Jenkins, a single mother of four who worked at
ResCare, Inc., the nation’s largest privately-owned home health care agency, was injured while
breaking up an assault between disabled clients. Id. The event occurred in full view of Ms.
Jenkins’s supervisor and she sought medical treatment at the emergency room directly after her
shift. Id. Ms. Jenkins failed to call the 1-800 number designated under the employer’s plan
within twenty-four hours of her injury and she was denied “all medical and disability benefits.”
Id. In Robert Wilson’s account, Ms. Jenkins did not call the designated number “until the 27th
hour, while she was at the company doctors [sic] office.” Id.
97. OKLA. STAT. tit. 85A, § 9(a–b) (2018).
98. See Burke, supra note 78, at 416–17.
99. See NATHAN BACCHUS ET AL., ALTERNATIVES TO TRADITIONAL WORKERS’
COMPENSATION SYSTEMS, RISK & INS. MGMT. SOC’Y 3 (2015), https://www.rims.org/
RiskKnowledge/RISKKnowledgeDocs/AlternativesWorkersComp_paper_1062015_92524.pd
f [https://perma.cc/BV8K-NS77]; Chris Patterson & John Colyandro, Workers’ Compensation:
Making It Work for Texans, POL’Y PERSP. 1, 7 (Feb. 1, 2005), http://www.txccri.org/
content/2005-02-workers.pdf [https://perma.cc/4Q5C-BRSS]; PETER ROUSMANIERE & JACK
ROBERTS, WORKERS’ COMPENSATION DEREGULATION ALERT: WHAT EMPLOYERS NEED TO
KNOW ABOUT THE NEW OKLAHOMA LAW (2013), http://riskandinsurance.com/wpcontent/uploads/2015/09/Sedgwick_Workers’-Compensation-Deregulation-Alert.pdf
[https://perma.cc/U92Y-K6A7].
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wage” and an overall “decline in severe, traumatic injury claims.”100 Still,
much of the support for opt-out has been geared towards business friendly
economic policy and the paring down of bureaucratic control, not injured
worker access to fair and appropriate benefits.
III. VASQUEZ V. DILLARD’S, INC.
Due to the unique makeup of each state’s workers’ compensation
statute, few state workers’ compensation cases create national attention.
Yet the Oklahoma Supreme Court’s decision in Vasquez v. Dillard’s,
Inc.101 has been touted by opt-out opponents and scholars as the most
meaningful workers’ compensation case in the past twenty years.102
In the fall of 2016, the Oklahoma Supreme Court declared the OEIBA
unconstitutional, after only three years in existence, pursuant to the
Oklahoma Constitution’s ban on “special laws.”103 The court found that
the statute created “impermissible, unequal, and disparate treatment of a
select group of injured workers.”104
The etiology of the litigation stems from neck and shoulder
aggravation injuries suffered by Dillard’s department store employee,
Jonnie Yvonne Vasquez, while working in 2014.105 Dillard’s had been
approved as a “qualified employer” under the OEIBA and processed
workers’ compensation claims under its own alternative benefit plan. The
compensability of Ms. Vasquez’s claim was denied under Dillard’s plan

100. Alison D. Morantz, Rejecting the Grand Bargain: What Happens When Large
Companies Opt Out of Workers’ Compensation?, 50 (Stan. Inst. for Econ. Res., Working Paper
No. 16-007, 2016), made available at https://siepr.stanford.edu/sites/default/files/publications/
16-007.pdf [https://perma.cc/C85K-ZA7J].
101. Vasquez v. Dillard’s, Inc., 381 P.3d 768, 787 (Okla. 2016).
102. Alan S. Pierce, Workers’ Comp Matters, LEGAL TALK NETWORK (Dec. 29, 2017),
https://legaltalknetwork.com/podcasts/workers-comp-matters/2017/12/new-york-workerscompensation-changes-in-2017/ [https://perma.cc/8C63-GKVG]. Michael Gruber, the former
president of the Workers Injury Law & Advocacy Group (WILG) notes specifically that the
Vasquez decision served as a “serious damper in the momentum of the Opt-Out threat
throughout the southeastern part of the United States.” Id.
103. Vasquez, 381 P.3d at 775. “The core provision of the Opt Out Act . . . creates
impermissible, unequal, disparate treatment of a select group of injured workers.” Id. at 770
(footnote omitted); see OKLA. CONST. art. V, § 59.
104. Vasquez, 381 P.3d at 775.
105. Id. at 770. The Oklahoma Supreme Court did not address the merits of Ms.
Vasquez’s claim and left the issue to the Oklahoma Workers’ Compensation Commission on
remand. Id. at 776.
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and Ms. Vasquez appealed the decision to Oklahoma’s Workers’
Compensation Commission (WCC).106
A. Oklahoma Workers’ Compensation Commission Ruling
The WCC ruled that the OEIBA (1) deprived injured workers, under
alternative benefit plans, equal protection of the law under the Oklahoma
constitution; (2) equated to an unconstitutional “special law” under the
Oklahoma Constitution; and (3) illicitly limited injured workers’ access to
a civil remedy.107 While only the first step in the appeals process, the
WCC’s decision was noteworthy for the opt-out movement for three
salient reasons.
First, the WCC held that Dillard’s alternative benefit plan was
governed by ERISA.108 ERISA exempts from its preemption plans
“maintained solely for the purpose of complying with applicable
workmen’s compensation laws.”109 The plan under which Ms. Vasquez
sought benefits was not “maintain[ed] solely” for workers’ compensation
because it included “non-occupational death benefits, in addition to the
benefits required under [the OEIBA].”110 However, the WCC reasoned
that Dillard’s ERISA-governed alternative benefit plan was not preempted
by ERISA because some of the benefits under its plan were required under
the OEIBA.111 Usually courts reading ERISA hold that any state laws or
regulations relating to a plan deemed to be an ERISA plan are

106. Id. at 770. Dillard’s originally attempted to remove the case to federal court, arguing
that their opt-out plan was governed by ERISA and thereby subject to federal preemption.
Vasquez v. Dillard’s, Inc., No. CIV-15-0861-F, 2015 WL 9906300, at *1 (W.D. Okla. Sept. 30,
2015). The federal district court denied removal, noting that the “action ar[ose] under the
work[ers’] compensation laws of Oklahoma . . . and the fact that the plan . . . may be . . . an
ERISA plan, d[id] not change the[] conclusion[].” Id. at *2.
107. Vasquez v. Dillard’s, Inc., No. CM-2014-11060L, ¶¶ 39, 45, 50 (Okla. Workers’
Comp. Comm’n, Feb. 26, 2016), https://www.ok.gov/wcc/documents/Vasquez.pdf
[https://perma.cc/R23R-U6XL] [hereinafter Commission Order]; see also Torrey, supra note 2,
at 71.
108. Commission Order, supra note 107, ¶ 3.
109. 29 U.S.C. § 1003(b)(3) (2018) (emphasis added); see also supra Section II.C.
110. Commission Order, supra note 107, ¶ 3. This type of benefit comingling had
previously been used by Texas alternative benefit plans to successfully trigger ERISA
preemption. See Hernandez v. Jobe Concrete Prods., Inc., 282 F.3d 360, 362 (5th Cir. 2002)
(holding that Texas alternative benefit plans were preempted by ERISA because the plans were
not “maintained solely for the purpose of complying with Texas workers’ compensation law”).
111. Commission Order, supra note 107, ¶ 3.
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preempted.112 The WCC’s holding, in essence, alleged some sort of state
administrative oversight of ERISA plans.
Second, the WCC considered itself a “court of competent
jurisdiction” to hear Ms. Vasquez’s ERISA claim.113 Under ERISA, a
civil action may be brought by a beneficiary of an ERISA plan “to recover
benefits due to him under the terms of his plan, to enforce his rights under
the terms of the plan, or to clarify his rights to future benefits under the
terms of the plan.”114 It is important to note that Section 502(a)(1)(B) of
ERISA only contemplates prosecuting an appeal through civil action
under the terms an ERISA governed plan, not through an administrative
procedure like a workers’ compensation appeal.115
Only two types of courts—state courts of competent jurisdiction and
district courts of the United States—have jurisdiction over ERISA
claims.116 In order to be a state court of competent jurisdiction, the WCC
opined that the Oklahoma legislature deemed it a court of competent
jurisdiction under the OIEBA pursuant to the following language:
Commission shall act as the court of competent jurisdiction under 29
U.S.C.A. Section 1132(e)(1), and shall possess adjudicative authority
to render decisions in individual proceedings by claimants to recover
benefits due to the claimant under the terms of the claimant’s plan, to
enforce the claimant’s rights under the terms of the plan, or to clarify
the claimant’s rights to future benefits under the terms of the plan.117

The legislature seemly set up the WCC as a court of competent
jurisdiction to hear ERISA claims under alternative benefit plans. The
problem with this reading of the OEIBA is that ERISA “supersede[s] any
and all State laws insofar as they . . . relate to any employee benefit
plan.”118 The “relate to” preemption has been broadly defined by the
Supreme Court to include any state laws “specifically designed to affect
employee benefit plans.”119 The Court has held that a state law that

112. See Hernandez, 282 F.3d at 361–63; see also Gobeille v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 136
S. Ct. 936, 947 (2016) (finding Vermont statute, as applied to ERISA plans, invalidated by
ERISA’s express pre-emption clause).
113. Commission Order, supra note 107, ¶ 7; see Torrey, supra note 2, at 67.
114. 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B) (2018).
115. Id. (explicitly stating “[a] civil action may be brought”).
116. Id. § 1132(e)(1).
117. OKLA. STAT. tit. 85A, § 211(b)(5) (2018), invalidated by Vasquez v. Dillard’s Inc.,
381 P.3d 768 (Okla. 2016); Commission Order, supra note 107, ¶¶ 6–7.
118. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (2018) (emphasis added).
119. See Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. McClendon, 498 U.S. 133, 140 (1990) (“[S]tate laws
which are ‘specifically designed to affect employee benefit plans’ are pre-empted under
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references or has a connection with ERISA will trigger ERISA preemption
of the state law.120 It seems inconsistent with a clear reading of ERISA
that the Oklahoma legislature could allow employers to create ERISA
plans and also allow state laws, which are preempted by ERISA, to govern
those plans.
Third, the WCC held it had authority to determine a constitutional
question.121 It is well recognized that “[t]he threshold issue in any judicial
or quasi-judicial proceeding is whether the tribunal has jurisdiction over
the subject matter.”122 Unlike courts of general jurisdiction, the subject
matter jurisdiction of state administrative agencies is often narrowly
defined by the agency’s enabling statute(s) or the state’s constitution.
Most state worker compensation statutes narrowly define the authority of
the administrative agency charged with facilitating workers’
compensation benefits to the adjudication of claims.123
At the outset of its analysis on jurisdiction of constitutional questions,
the WCC noted that administrative agencies “do not have the authority to
determine constitutional questions.”124 The WCC reasoned that since “the
Oklahoma legislature . . . established the [WCC] as the court of competent
jurisdiction in Section 211” of the OEIBA, in regard to jurisdiction over
ERISA claims, the legislature had also conferred it with the authority to
determine state constitutional questions.125

§ 514(a).” (quoting Mackey v. Lanier Collection Agency & Serv., Inc., 486 U.S. 825, 829
(1988))).
120. Shaw v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 463 US 85, 96–97 (1983). Furthermore, if a state law
directly conflicts with ERISA, the state law is preempted by ERISA. See also District of
Columbia v. Greater Washington Bd. of Trade, 506 U.S. 125, 129–30 (1992) (citations omitted)
(“Under § 514(a), ERISA pre-empts any state law that refers to or has a connection with covered
benefit plans . . . even if the law is not specifically designed to affect such plans, or the effect is
only indirect, and even if the law is ‘consistent with ERISA’s substantive requirements.’”).
121. Commission Order, supra note 107, ¶¶ 8–9.
122. Geoffrey R. Bonham, It Depends on the Question: Limits on the Jurisdiction of
Administrative Agencies Over Constitutional Disputes, 13 S.C. LAW. 15, 15 (2001).
123. E.g., OR. REV. STAT. § 656.704(3)(a) (2018) (stating that the authority of Oregon’s
Workers’ Compensation Board to conduct hearings is limited to “matters concerning a claim”);
WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 263-12-010(1–7) (2018) (enunciating that the Washington Board of
Industrial Insurance Appeals has the authority to hear disputes arising under only specific listed
statutes).
124. Commission Order, supra note 107, ¶ 8. The commission noted the Oklahoma
Supreme Court’s decision in Dow Jones & Co. v. Oklahoma ex rel. Oklahoma Tax Commission
supported the proposition that “[all] statute[s are] . . . constitutionally valid until a court of
competent jurisdiction declares otherwise.” Id. (quoting Dow Jones & Co. v. Okla. ex rel. Okla.
Tax Comm’n, 787 P.2d 843, 845 (Okla. 1990)).
125. Id. at ¶¶ 8–9.
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Section 211 of the OIEBA states the type of authority given to the
Commission under its review of ERISA claims as “adjudicative authority”
to determine claimant benefits under “claimant’s plan.”126 Language such
as “individual proceedings” and “enforce . . . rights under the terms of the
plan,”127 likely suggests a narrow focus within the meaning of a “court[]
of competent jurisdiction.”128 Furthermore, the principle that the
Oklahoma legislature has the power to convert an administrative agency
into a court with the authority to deem a statute unconstitutional raises
separation of powers issues.129 It is, therefore, most likely that Section
211(5) of the OEIBA limits the WCC’s review power to the rights and
procedures under the alternative benefit plan.
B. Oklahoma Supreme Court’s Ruling in Vasquez v. Dillard’s, Inc.
Some commentators speculated how the Oklahoma Supreme Court
would approach the WCC’s jurisdictional rulings.130 The court, however,
barely mentioned WCC’s controversial reading of ERISA implications
under the OEIBA or the limits of WCC’s jurisdiction. Instead, the court
considered the merits of the case and held the OEIBA unconstitutional
pursuant to Oklahoma’s constitutional ban on “special laws.”131 The
Oklahoma Constitution states: “Laws of a general nature shall have a
uniform operation throughout the State, and where a general law can be
made applicable, no special law shall be enacted.”132 In the court’s view,
the OEIBA “create[d the] impermissible, unequal, [and] disparate
treatment of a select group of injured workers,”133 with alternative benefit
plan workers having substantively subordinate rights compared to workers
bound under Oklahoma’s Workers’ Compensation Act.134

126. OKLA. STAT. tit. 85A, § 211(B)(5) (2018), invalidated by Vasquez v. Dillard’s Inc.,
381 P.3d 768 (Okla. 2016).
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. See Michael C. Duff, Workers’ Comp Agency Declares Oklahoma Opt-Out Statute
Unconstitutional,
LEXISNEXIS:
LEGAL
NEWS
ROOM
(Feb.
29,
2016),
https://www.lexisnexis.com/legalnewsroom/workers-compensation/b/recent-cases-newstrends-developments/posts/workers-comp-agency-declares-oklahoma-opt-out-statuteunconstitutional (noting the difficulty of parsing out whether a legislature can delegate
executive branch official authority that is normally regulated to the judicial branch).
130. See id. (“The WCC’s decision may ultimately have set up a collision between ERISA
preemption and the Oklahoma State Constitution.”).
131. Vasquez v. Dillard’s, Inc., 381 P.3d 768, 770 (Okla. 2016).
132. OKLA. CONST. art. V, § 59.
133. Vasquez, 381 P.3d at 775.
134. Id. at 773.
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When determining the constitutionality of a “special law” under the
Oklahoma constitution, Oklahoma courts use a three-prong test.135 First,
a court must identify a class implicated by the law in question. If the law
regulates all “persons or things” within the presumed class, then the law
is a general law, at which point the analysis ends. If the law singles out
“persons or things” within the class for different treatment, then it is a
“special law.”136 If it is determined a special law, the court then considers
whether it would have been impossible for a general law to accomplish
the same function. Finally, the special law must be shown to substantially
relate to a valid legislative objective.137
Dillard’s argued that the defined class for the court’s special law
analysis should be “all employers,” not injured workers. In Dillard’s
view, all employers had an equal opportunity to opt-out of the workers’
compensation coverage and, therefore, no “special law” had been created
by the OEIBA.138 The court noted that the Employee Injury Benefit Act’s
title “serve[d] as legislative intent” to indicate that the class at issue was
“injured employees.”139
Dillard’s further contended that, even if the OEIBA were a “special
law,” it was constitutionally permissible because the Act was
“substantially and reasonably related to a legitimate government
objective.”140 Accordingly, the court will “not accept the invitation of
employers to find a discriminatory state statute constitutional by relying
on the interests of employers in reducing compensation costs.”141 The
court also noted precedent under Oklahoma’s “special law” provision that
the permissibility of a “special law” hinged on a “distinctive characteristic
upon which a different treatment may reasonably be founded” between
two groups within a class.142 The court found no distinctive characteristic
for different treatment between members of the “injured workers” class.
The court did note that the WCC had “no authority to determine the
facial constitutionality of the Opt Out Act as a special law.”143 As such,
the court did not affirm the WCC’s assertion that the OEIBA was, in its
entirety, unconstitutional. Somewhat mystifying was that the court still
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.

Reynolds v. Porter, 760 P.2d 816, 822 (Okla. 1988).
Id.
Id.
Vasquez, 381 P.3d at 772–73.
Id.
Id. at 774.
Id. (citing Torres v. Seaboard Foods, LLC, 373 P.3d 1057, 1079 (Okla. 2016)).
Id. (quoting Grant v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 5 P.3d 594, 598 (Okla. 2000)).
Id. at 771.
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considered the constitutional questions in the case even though it
acknowledged that the WCC overstepped its authority by determining the
OEIBA’s constitutionality.144 The court determined its authority to
consider constitutional questions could overcome any argument that the
“special law” issue was not properly before it.145
As for the ERISA thicket created by the WCC’s decision, the court
did not address the issue at all. In a footnote, the court stated the issue had
been waived by the parties.146 Preemption of any kind is, of course, a
question of subject matter jurisdiction and is not waivable by either
party.147 By not addressing the ERISA issue, the court, in one sense,
affirmed the WCC’s self-proclaimed authority to review ERISA claims
that fall within the workers’ compensation scheme.148
C. Constitutional Challenges Beyond Vasquez v. Dillard’s, Inc.
The workers’ compensation industry has been eager to see a supreme
court tackle the looming questions surrounding opt-out, and while the
Vasquez court broached this subject, it passed on many issues that will
likely be addressed by future courts. State and federal equal protection
arguments, which were thoroughly briefed by the parties, were not
addressed in the court’s opinion.149 In fact, the court specifically noted
they did “not reach[] other constitutional challenges to the Opt Out Act
based on denials of equal protection, due process, and access to courts” on
state or federal grounds.150
Even if the ERISA quagmire is avoided and state constitutional
“special law” provisions are not implicated in future opt-out litigation,
courts will likely struggle with an equal protection analysis. Legal scholar
Michael Duff notes that this is partially because the right of recovery for
an injury is not considered fundamental in the U.S. or states’ constitutions,
144. See Torrey, supra note 2, at 67.
145. See Vasquez, 381 P.3d at 771.
146. Id. n.12.
147. See Torrey, supra note 2, at 68.
148. Vasquez, 381 P.3d at 783–84 (Gurich, J., concurring) (noting that the opt-out plans
were essentially workers’ compensation plans and therefore exempt from ERISA preemption);
Commission Order, supra note 107, ¶¶ 8–9.
149. See Petitioner Dillard’s, Inc.’s Brief-in-Chief at 4–6, Vasquez v. Dillard’s, Inc., 381
P.3d 768 (Okla. 2016) (No. 114,810), 2016 WL 6277354, at *4–6 (arguing that opt-out does not
violate Oklahoma’s equal protection clause); Brief of Amici Curiae Academic Experts in
Support of Respondent Vasquez at 4, Vasquez v. Dillard’s, Inc., 381 P.3d 768 (Okla. 2016) (No.
114,810), 2016 WL 6277355, at *4 (arguing that the OEIBA “violates the equal protection and
due process clauses of the Oklahoma and U.S. Constitutions”).
150. Vasquez, 381 P.3d at 775.
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and because “injured workers . . . do not make up a traditional suspect or
quasi-suspect classification.”151 Therefore, under a typical equal
protection analysis, injured workers, as a class, “are subject only to
deferential rational basis review.”152 As the Supreme Court noted in
F.C.C. v. Beach Communications, Inc., under rational basis review, social
and economic policy “must be upheld against equal protection challenge
if there is any reasonably conceivable state of facts that could provide a
rational basis for the classification.”153 Under this highly deferential
standard, it is possible that the OEIBA, under an equal protection
argument, would pass state and federal constitutional muster.
While most states do have a provision regarding “special laws” in
their constitutions, they are often viewed as a vestige of the 1800s with
very few state courts giving the constitutional provisions teeth.154 Future
constitutional challenges on equal protection grounds to opt-out statutes
that resemble OEIBA may have an uphill battle.155 Further adding to these
difficulties is the fact that the Vasquez decision offers no persuasive value
for other jurisdictions.
In terms of policy, the OEIBA likely leaned too far towards the
interests of employers. The Vasquez court discussed the Grand Bargain’s
quid pro quo tort immunity in its opinion and opined that, while the
legislature was free to abolish the workers’ compensation system entirely,
substantially reducing worker benefits while retaining an exclusive
remedy was not appropriate.156 Perhaps, as the court suggests, repealing
the exclusive remedy doctrine is the most assured way to uphold
alternative benefit plans for injured workers. As noted in Texas, full tort
liability, mitigated through employment arbitration agreements in
alternative benefit plans, has precedent to withstand constitutional
challenges.157
151. See Worse than Pirates, supra note 89, at 177.
152. Id. at 178.
153. F.C.C. v. Beach Commc’n, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 313 (1993).
154. See Justin R. Long, State Constitutional Prohibitions on Special Laws, 60 CLEV. ST.
L. REV. 719, 761–64 (2012).
155. It is important to note that some state supreme courts have found that the right to
recover for personal injuries is an important substantive right and have subjected it to a more
rigorous review than rational basis. E.g., Carson v. Mauer, 424 A.2d 825, 830 (N.H. 1980)
(“We now conclude, however, that the rights involved herein are sufficiently important to
require that the restrictions imposed on those rights be subjected to a more rigorous judicial
scrutiny than allowed under the rational basis test.”).
156. Vasquez v. Dillard’s, Inc., 381 P.3d 768, 786–87 (Okla. 2016) (Gurich, J.,
concurring).
157. Supra Section II.A.
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IV. THE FOURTH ERA AND THE FUTURE OF OPT-OUT
Prior to the Vasquez decision, the opt-out movement had gained
momentum by introducing legislation in Tennessee and South Carolina in
2015.158 Yet, since Vasquez, the bills in both Tennessee and South
Carolina lost support.159 Further, Florida and Arkansas, two jurisdictions
that appeared ripe for opt-out legislation, saw no substantial momentum
for opt-out legislation during 2017.160
While the Vasquez decision clearly knocked the wind out of the optout movement, it is unlikely that the opinion sounded the death knell for
alternative benefit plans or other workers’ compensation workarounds. If
anything, Vasquez pointed out the pitfalls of sweeping opt-out reform.
In response to Vasquez, the Association for Responsible Alternatives
to Workers’ Compensation (ARAWC) hired national employment and
labor law firm Littler Mendelson P.C. in 2017 to lobby at the federal level
for workers’ compensation reform.161 The ARAWC is reportedly funded
by large retailers, such as Walmart, Whole Foods, and Macy’s, which
likely have an economic incentive for national or state opt-out
legislation.162
Alternatively, other industries seek to disqualify their workers from
workers’ compensation through exemptions. In 2018, Tennessee passed
HB 1978/SB 1967, which defined workers (marketplace contractors) who
use a marketplace platform to find handyman type work—such as Handy

158. S.B. 0721, 109th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Tenn. 2015), http://www.capitol.tn.gov/
Bills/109/Bill/SB0721.pdf [https://perma.cc/584F-8WJ6]; H.B. 4197, 121st Gen. Assemb.,
Reg. Sess. (S.C. 2015), https://www.scstatehouse.gov/sess121_2015-2016/bills/4197.htm
[https://perma.cc/BN3F-HAHE].
159. Michael Grabell, The Corporations Trying to Ditch Workers’ Compensation Hit a
Snag, PACIFIC STANDARD (March 8, 2016), https://psmag.com/economics/the-corporationstrying-to-ditch-workers-compensation-hit-a-snag [https://perma.cc/2BT8-HEXH].
160. Laura Kersey, Alternative Workers Compensation Mechanisms—What’s Happening
With Opt-Out?, NCCI (Dec. 15, 2017), https://www.ncci.com/Articles/Pages/II_Insights_OptOut.aspx [https://perma.cc/4N2F-NZY6] (explaining that Arkansas introduced legislation for
opt-out in 2017, but it did not advance, while no bill in Florida was introduced).
161. “In 2017, perhaps in response to the failure of the legislation and the vociferous
opposition, ARAWC hired Littler Mendelson to promote opt-out nationally.” Emily A.
Spieler, (Re)assessing the Grand Bargain: Compensation for Work Injuries in the United
States, 1900-2017, 69 RUTGERS U. L. REV. 891, 952–53 (2017).
162. Id.; Michael Grabell & Howard Berkes, Inside Corporate America’s Campaign to
Ditch Workers’ Comp, PROPUBLICA (Oct. 14, 2015), https://www.propublica.org/article/insidecorporate-americas-plan-to-ditch-workers-comp [https://perma.cc/A5WL-UCBL] (outlining
how large corporations reap monetary incentives from opt-out legislation).
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or Takl—as merchant contractors exempt from workers’ compensation.163
While politically the legislation was specifically targeting handymen, the
law broadly defines “marketplace contractor” as any individual that
utilizes an app to connect with third-parties for work and compensation.164
Some have argued that the breadth of the definition could allow “any
business providing virtually any service by way of ‘online-enabled
application, software, website, or system that enables the provision of
services’” to exempt its workers from Tennessee’s workers’ compensation
system.165
Tennessee, like Oklahoma, has a constitutional ban on special laws
that could be used to argue against the disparate treatment of “merchant
contractor” injured workers.166 Yet unlike Vasquez, where injured
workers subject to alternative benefit plans were precluded from accessing
benefits through the workers’ compensation system,167 the Tennessee law
actively reclassifies workers prior to their invitation (or non-invitation)
into the workers’ compensation system.168 If a “special laws” argument
were to be brought against the Tennessee law, an injured “merchant
contractor” may have to first show that “merchant contractors” are not
independent contractors, but rather employees, before a “special laws”
claim would be entertained. Broadly reclassifying certain occupational
relationships in such a way as to fall outside compulsory workers’
compensation coverage may be an effective opt-out alternative for
industries looking to sidestep the courts.
The federal government has also weighed in on the opt-out debate.
In 2016, the Department of Labor (D.o.L.) issued a report critical of
163. TENN. CODE ANN. § 50-8-101 (2018); 2018 Tenn. Pub. Acts 648; see Michael C.
Duff, New Tennessee “Gig” Law: “Handyman Special” or New Flavor of Opt-Out, L.
PROFESSOR BLOG NETWORK (Mar. 20, 2018), http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/
workerscomplaw/2018/03/new-tennessee-gig-law-handyman-special-or-new-flavor-of-optout.html [https://perma.cc/JR7P-RBE2] [hereinafter “Gig” Law]. Handy was a corporate
sponsor for HB 1978/ SB 1967. Lydia DePillis, For Gig Economy Workers in These States,
Rights Are at Risk, CNN BUSINESS: CNN MONEY (Mar. 14, 2018 4:54 PM),
https://money.cnn.com/2018/03/14/news/economy/handy-gig-economy-workers/index.html
[https://perma.cc/U3QZ-M27J].
164. § 50-8-101.
165. See “Gig” Law, supra note 163.
166. The legislature has no power to pass laws “for the benefit of individuals inconsistent
with the general laws of the land” or to “pass any law granting to any
individual . . . exemptions . . . by the same law extended to any member of the community, who
may be able to bring himself within the provisions of such law.” TENN. CONST. art. XI, § 8.
167. Vasquez v. Dillard’s, Inc., 381 P.3d 768, 784–86 (Okla. 2016).
168. § 50-8-10. The Tennessee law’s broad definition of “marketplace contractor” could
inadvertently create a large class of workers without access to workers compensation benefits.
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worker benefits available under most state workers’ compensation
statutes.169 The then U.S. D.o.L. Secretary, Thomas Perez, was also on
record calling opt-out “a pathway to poverty for people who get injured
on the job.”170 It is possible that the D.o.L. may shift its position on
workers’ compensation benefits under the Trump administration to more
closely align with the economic interests of employers. While it is
unlikely that a federal takeover of state workers’ compensation will occur
in the current climate of government downsizing, it is possible that a shift
in the federal attitude on workers’ compensation may empower opt-out
proponents to pursue future legislation.171
As previously noted, the last period of sweeping state legislative
reforms that benefitted workers were in response to a proposed federal
takeover of state workers’ compensation schemes.172 Perhaps the only
way to cogently determine opt-out’s viability would be for the Supreme
Court to weigh in—the U.S. Supreme Court has not ruled on the
constitutionality of the exclusive remedy doctrine of workers’
compensation since 1917.173
CONCLUSION
This new fourth era of workers’ compensation is truly unique from
prior eras of reform. Whereas access to medical benefits and time loss
was the bargained for right of an injured worker, that right is now being
repackaged as just another benefit to be comingled among the many
benefits that employers may offer.174

169. See U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, DOES THE WORKERS’ COMPENSATION SYSTEM FULFILL
OBLIGATIONS TO INJURED WORKERS? 19 (2016), https://www.dol.gov/asp/
WorkersCompensationSystem/WorkersCompensationSystemReport.pdf
[https://perma.cc/73DP-9BL5]. “Notably, there have been legislative efforts to restrict benefits
and increase employer control over benefits and claim processing, most dramatically
exemplified by the opt-out legislation enacted . . . .” Id. at 2.
170. Howard Berkes, Labor Secretary Calls Workers’ Comp Opt-Out Plans a ‘Pathway
to Poverty’, NPR (Mar. 25, 2016, 1:29 PM), http://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2016/03/
25/471849458/labor-secretary-calls-workerscompoptplans-a-pathway-to-poverty
[https://perma.cc/K6JY-7EK6].
171. See Lisa Rein & Andrew Ba Tran, How the Trump Era is Changing the Federal
Bureaucracy, WASH. POST (Dec. 30, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/howthe-trump-era-is-changing-the-federal-bureaucracy/2017/12/30/8d5149c6-daa7-11e7-b859fb0995360725_story.html?utm_term=.4ff054954241 [https://perma.cc/PS7L-HXDZ] (“The
White House is now warning agencies to brace for even deeper cuts in the 2019 budget it will
announce early next year, part of an effort to lower the federal deficit to pay for the new tax
law . . . .”).
172. See supra Section I.C.
173. N.Y. Cent. R.R. v. White, 243 U.S. 188, 195–96 (1917); see supra Section I.B.
174. See Torrey, supra note 2, at 71.
ITS
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It is far too early to tell whether Vasquez was a blip on the radar, or
the beginning of a concerted effort by multi-state employers to break away
from the traditional century-old workers’ compensation model. If opt-out
proponents successfully lobby for legislation allowing ERISA to divest
state agencies from any meaningful oversight, it will likely end in another
state supreme court decision with resounding effect.
It is hard to determine whether opt-out announces a true shift in social
consciousness or merely the influence of strong lobbying. However, the
use of sponsored legislation by industry to leave the Grand Bargain does
leave labor with little negotiating leverage. A hundred years ago, labor
and industry were willing to sit down and compromise to ensure both
parties had security. Now, it seems industry may want to opt-out of any
further discourse.

